Current Price: $12.5
Target Price: $20-$25
Upside: 50-100%
Expiration Date: Q3 2026
Angi is a fallen angel in the late innings of a turnaround, with a business inflection expected this year. The stock is quite controversial: with short interest at 18%, many are betting this recovery won’t stick. There’s no shortage of failed comeback stories so the market is right to be skeptical. However, a series of recent developments at Angi have caught my attention. Taken together, they send an intriguing signal from management that the business recovery is real and that the market may be underestimating how close Angi is to turning a corner.
If management is right, profitability could inflect by mid-year on a stock that is already cheap. On LTM earnings Angi is trading at 6x EBITDA and 12x FCF, even after fully accounting for stock-based compensation. These multiples are likely to expand as operational momentum builds. The catalyst could arrive as early as next month, when the company is expected to provide 2026 guidance alongside its Q4’25 results. Combination of improving earnings and higher valuation multiples, could easily lead to 50%-100% upside.
I do want to stress, that Angi is a relatively well-followed stock. The market may already be pricing it correctly, and I’m not claiming any particular edge or original insight into the underlying business. In fact, even after recent disclosure improvements, I think visibility into some important dynamics of Angi’s business remains limited. So take my own views on the business with a healthy grain of salt.
What I do like, however, is that a large portion of the bear case appears to be already reflected in the low valuation. That limits the potential downside. Given the progress of the turnaround, the business would need to deteriorate hard and fast to drive meaningful losses from the current share price levels. That seems unlikely. That said, if momentum stalls, I could see the stock drifting toward $10/share by mid-year (25% downside). Overall, the setup seems to be quite asymmetric.
The turnaround story
Angi needs little introduction, but some context on the turnaround is necessary to understand how the company arrived at the current setup and what exactly could catalyze the upside this year.
Angi is the leading platform for home improvement services in the U.S. It operates across three main brands: Angi, HomeAdvisor, and Handy. These are marketplaces that connect service professionals with homeowners. A few years ago, management estimated that one in seven U.S. households had been using one of Angi’s services to book a handyman for home maintenance jobs, i.e., plumbing, roofing, electrical work, etc. The company generates revenue through ads, fees paid by service providers for delivered leads (even if those leads don’t result in getting the job), and subscription plans that give providers priority placement. This is a business with minimal capex requirements, however, due to high churn (the reported retention of service providers is only around 60%), the company needs to constantly spend marketing dollars to attract consumers and professionals to both sides of its market places. Selling and marketing expenses account for around 50% of revenues.
Aside from the platforms, the company also has a Services segment, which specializes in pre-priced offerings (e.g. the customer pays a fixed sum to Angi for a specific job, which then finds and dispatches contractors to perform it).
In its current form, the company was assembled through a series of transactions, primarily through the merger of Angie’s List and HomeAdvisor in 2017, followed by the acquisition of Handy in 2018. For years, Angi was a publicly listed subsidiary of IAC, which owned 84% of the company. That changed in March 2025, when IAC spun off Angi fully, by distributing its stake to IAC shareholders. For more on the business background please refer to this VIC pitch and this post from High Growth Investing which covers the company history really well.
The home services platform business benefited from the COVID boom, with Angi’s revenue in 2022 reaching $1.9bn, up 43% versus 2019. However, it quickly became clear that higher scale was not translating into improved profitability, but rather into a massive cash burn. EBITDA dropped from $200m in 2019 to negative $35m-$60m in 2021-2022.
This exposed a series of strategic missteps, the major ones of which were:
- Management put strong emphasis on growing the Services segment. The fixed-price model backfired amid elevated demand and labor shortages, leading to pricing and labor issues and, ultimately, significant losses for Angi. Despite generating $381m of revenue in 2022, the Services segment lost $52m of adj. EBITDA (versus $67m of total adj. EBITDA that year).
- Angi ventured into the roofing business through the acquisition of Total Home Properties, a move away from the platform model and toward operating services directly. It proved far more difficult than expected and resulted in significant losses: despite generating $138m of revenue in 2022, the segment lost $21m in adj. EBITDA. Management later admitted that this “probably wasn’t the smartest move we ever made”.
- Another issue was that the company became dependent on low-quality, lower-margin leads sourced from third-party network channel (e.g. retail partners). One example would be a retail store directing customers who had just bought a TV set to Angi in case they wanted it mounted on the wall. This produced a large volume of low-intent leads for contractors, who paid Angi for the lead but often ended up with no job. In 2024, 40% of all service requests came from clients generated by third-parties.
Overall, much of the demand spike during covid turned into what the company itself calls an ’empty calorie revenue’ that added volume but not profits. It also led to poor experiences for both customers and service providers, elevated churn of professionals, and cash burn. As the COVID boom faded and these quality and profitability issues were exposed, the market punished the stock, driving it down from $150/share in 2018-2021 to $13/share today.
In 2022, Angi’s chairman Joey Levin, who was also IAC’s CEO at the time, stepped into the CEO role at Angi and launched a multi-year turnaround, promising to refocus on the core fundamentals of the business.
- The Services segment was substantially scaled down, with revenue falling from $381m in 2022 to $94m in 2024, and has since reached modest profitability levels.
- The Roofing segment was fully divested in 2023.
- Network-channel-sourced leads were reduced from 40% of total leads in 2024 to 10% currently.
- The overall emphasis shifted back to lead quality.
- Last year, Angi overhauled how professionals and homeowners are matched, moving away from an automatic algorithm driven system to one where homeowners choose which providers they want to hear from. Apparently, this has improved the likelihood that selected providers actually win the job by 60%.
- Cost cutting measures were implemented.
- The final step in the turnaround is consolidating Angi’s brands onto a single platform. To date, the brands have operated on separate platforms with different management teams and sales forces. The company has been building a unified platform for some time and expects to complete the transition in early 2027, which should drive additional cost savings and efficiency gains.
As a result, profitability has rebounded close to pre-COVID levels. The company showed positive EBIT in 2024 for the first time in five years and has remained in that territory since. EBITDA margins improved from 2-4% in 2021-2022 to 12% in 2024/TTM. Free cash flow has also turned positive after material losses in 2021 and 2022. Average monthly churn among professionals declined from 8.6% in 2023 to 5.9%. See the table below for historical financials.
At $12.5/share, Angi’s market cap is $540m, and enterprise value stands at $700m.
Despite the recovery in earnings, the stock remains at all time lows. The market is apparently concerned that Angi is headed for a secular decline and that management’s expectation of the turnaround will not pan out.
The key question, therefore, is whether Angi can stabilize the topline and return to growth.
Management says the business will turn the corner this year, arguing that the turnaround is largely complete and that revenue decline was driven by post-COVID normalization, Roofing segment divestment as well as the intentional scaling down of the Services segment. That decline then stretched into 2025 due to the removal of low-quality leads and the transition to a new matching system that generates fewer, but higher-quality, leads. With these headwinds now behind us, the growth is about to return.
When the market disagrees with optimistic management, the market is usually proven right eventually. However, in Angi’s case, several reasons lead me to believe management knows better, and that the earnings inflection this year might be much larger than the market expects.
Chairman/CEO Joey Levin
Let’s start with the man at the wheel. Joey Levin stepped down as IAC’s CEO and, following the spin-off, shifted his focus to Angi, where he became executive chairman, co-leading the company alongside CEO Jeffrey Kip. It is unusual for a long-tenured (10 years) CEO of a much larger and more prestigious company to leave that role in order to focus on a smallish spin-off. Often, that is a signal that the executive sees something particularly compelling in the spinco. Here is how Levin described the move during the transition. To me, it reads as a fairly direct hint that an inflection is approaching and that he expects meaningful growth ahead:
And on the professional side, Angi just still has asymmetrical upside, I believe. And I know how hard it’s been. I know it is in this business, but as I started to say before, the news is, I think we’ve done most of the hard stuff. We’ve pulled out most of the challenging things. And we know it’s — believe me, no fun to sit in front of all of you and own some big mistakes and rip out some sizable chunks of revenue. But that really, especially with the changes Jeff talked about in the letter on January 13 is now behind us. And that means we — the — I think the pains in the rearview mirror and now we finally get to focus on building again. And that building process with a product that makes us proud is a fun thing to do, and I’m really excited to do it.
This vote of confidence from Levin is not a minor thing. He is a proven operator who generated enormous value for IAC shareholders during his tenure from 2015 to 2025 (including through three major spin-offs: Match, Vimeo, and Angi). Levin has been Angi’s chairman since 2017 and knows the business inside out. Barry Diller, IAC’s founder, noted that Levin “has wanted a store of his own for some time and the spin-off of Angi affords him this opportunity.” The fact that Levin chose Angi as that personal shop suggests a serious commitment to making the business work as a standalone company. It helps that Angi’s CEO since 2024, Jeffrey Kip, is also a well-regarded operator who previously turned-around and scaled Angi’s international segment and earlier served as IAC’s CFO.
I have read some speculations that Levin might’ve been pushed out of IAC rather than choosing to transition to Angi. I find this hard to believe. If the goal was simply to remove him, it is difficult to see why he would be retained as executive chairman at Angi, particularly given that Barry Diller also owns 7% of Angi’s shares. The argument feels stretched, but it is worth noting as part of the broader bear case.
Stock repurchases
Another aspect that adds weight to the ‘management’s conviction’ argument is that, as soon as Levin transitioned to Angi, the company began repurchasing shares at an extremely aggressive pace. In just two quarters (Q2 and Q3 2025), the company bought back 12% of shares at prices above current levels.
This pace won’t continue, as a newly spun off company faces limits on how much stock it is allowed to buy back. Even so, in September, management authorized repurchase of an additional 3.2m shares, or 7.4% of the total, noting that fully utilizing this authorization would bring the company close to those limits. Taken together, that likely sum up to 20% of shares repurchased shortly after Levin’s transition.
However, it’s important to note that despite large buybacks, there are hardly any insider purchases of Angi stock, which does put a dent in this ‘management’s conviction’ argument.
Workforce reduction and hint of massive cost-savings
In the 8K filing last week, Angi announced a 12.5% workforce reduction aimed at optimizing expenses in light of what it described as “AI-driven efficiency improvements”. The restructuring is expected to be completed in Q1 2026. After booking a total of $22-$30m of restructuring charges in Q4 2025 and Q1 2026, management expects the layoffs to generate $70-$80m in annual savings across operating expenses and capex.
The size of those savings is massive relative to the company’s current earnings power. Angi is generating about $140m of EBITDA. If management can actually deliver on the projected savings, the impact on profitability would be very material and might finally convince the market of the turnaround success. These cost savings might already get reflected in the 2026 earnings guidance that I expect to be announced with Q4 result.
So why then the stock hasn’t repriced after the restructuring update? The latest announcement was disclosed quietly in an 8-K filing, without a separate press release. Skeptics have questioned why the company chose to release the news so quietly. If the development was unequivocally positive, why not pair it with preliminary earnings and properly present it alongside formal guidance? Or wait for the full results next month? One interpretation is that the layoffs were driven by continuing business pressures rather than by AI efficiencies.
While that’s a risk, it is hard to square a scenario in which Levin transitions to Angi, management repeatedly guides to growth in 2026, the company buybacks more than 12% of the share count in just two quarters, announces substantial “efficiency driven” restructuring, only for the business to massively deteriorate soon after that. It would make Levin look like a complete bufoon, and would be a severe reputational hit for the management. While not impossible, it feels like a tail risk rather than anything close to a base case.
The situation remains ambiguous, which is precisely why the opportunity exists. In weighing the two interpretations, I am more inclined to trust the one on which management has chosen to place its career, reputation, and the company’s capital through aggressive buybacks.
The AI efficiency argument is also not something that management just pulled out of the bag. Angi has been deploying AI across customer research, including interviews with service providers and homeowners, processing sales scripts, and code development for some time, with the explicit goal of reducing costs. Many companies cut headcount last year on the back of similar AI-driven efficiency gains. For example, Salesforce eliminated 4,000 positions after stating that up to 50% of certain workloads were already being handled by AI. In that context, it is entirely possible that Angi is seeing similar benefits, and that the layoffs reflect productivity gains rather than a shrinking business.
There was also this interesting exchange on the most recent Q3 call. An analyst noted that management’s tone around 2026 EBITDA has become more positive. In response, the CEO suggested that AI would play an important role in driving the earnings inflection going forward.
Analyst
Just one maybe on the 2026 EBITDA. I think the language maybe shifted a little better from similar to modest to that more modest higher end from last quarter. So just curious what’s driving that? Is that some of the expected efficiencies from the platform migration, or some of those AI efficiencies from the internal tools you’re using that you called out in the letter.
CEO
So I don’t have our transcript from last quarter in front of me. I think we said mid-single-digit revenue growth and a little bit of margin leverage. I’m not sure if you said a modest, similar or what we said. I think when we look at our margins next year, we’re not predicting contribution margin leverage because we’re going to invest up in the branded area. We think we get our leverage by holding our fixed cost discipline, which I think if you look at the P&L over the last couple of years. Rusty and the team have done a very nice job with. So we do think we’re able to get efficiency by being AI first. We think you put a multiplier on human productivity, whether it’s coding, or processing sales scripts or doing customer research. So we think we’re going to be able to hold our head count and keep our fixed costs down and realize the leverage at the fixed cost line as a baseline.
All eyes are now on the Q4 earnings expected next month, where management will hopefully shed more details on the restructuring and 2026 guidance.
Thanks, dt.
Have you seen or run any good replacement or liquidation value analyses? I am just wondering how far away the current trading is from credit support levels as a proxy for margin of safety. I suppose your 25% estimate of potential downside getting you to $10/share, $400mm market cap, $550mm tev has to be fairly close to recovery value.
Their 2028 bonds seem to be trading at 96 on a 5.5-6% so nothing distressed. I guess the bears just see this as a slow melting ice cube due to the churn and secular decline, as you mentioned.
There was something on ibkr news about a spike in implied vol on the May calls. Is there some q1/q2 inflection point to consider beyond earnings?
https://www.tradingview.com/symbols/NASDAQ-ANGI/bonds/
This is still a viable business that generates positive cashflows, so I do not think anyone is considering liquidation. But in terms of hard asset protection, there is none. The only value is in the platform businesses, and it is viable only as long as revenues generated from platform fees are higher than user acquisition costs (on both service provider and customer sides).
Thanks. Yep, figured no hard assets, but I hadn’t yet looked at balance sheet. I was just wondering what the ip might be worth in a hard downside scenario.
If the model is based off Angi getting a cut, what prevents a client from directly paying the contractor down the road? I know there’s probably a contract with Angi, but all the client has to do after the first visit is calling the contractor back up and negotiate a price which cuts out Angi. There is no moat in this middleman business.
As far as I understand, nothing is preventing direct dealings between contractor and customer after the initial contact is established via Angi’s services. And that is probably the core reason why Angi needs to spend half of its revenue on marketing to attract new service providers and customers. Any subsequent handyman jobs for the same customer are much more likely to be booked directly. The repeat bookings on Angi’s platforms should be pretty low.
Having said that, it was always the case and Angi still managed to grow. Also, lots of handyman jobs are one-time in nature (like fixing plumbing, or assembling kitchen table top), so the number of repeat-jobs is likely to be much smaller compared to first time handyman jobs.
I beg to differ. Recently I use a similar free service (to me) to find a floor installer. He has a lot of 5 star reviews and low price. The result is terrible and I still have to fix the damage he made. That makes me doubt on any similar services with the inflated review. I find the quality of contractors by the word of mouth is a bit better given I can see their previous work first.
For a plumber in your example, Iits a repeating service , I will keep him for future use or ask for referral as people of similar quality attracts each other.
So the downside risk of the ANGI business model is big even if the valuation might be low.
ANGI getting demolished with the rest of the software universe today. Trading around $11.85 right now.
ANGI is not a software company
Tell that to the people whacking the bid. ;-)
This is probably getting caught up the ability of LLMs to drive consumers directly to service providers, which would disintermediate part of ANGI’s business model
I wouldn’t call it “demolished”, stock closed at $12.04/share.
Missed 33c earnings estimate by 16c, reporting 17c per share earnings. Stock price dropped to 10.11 after hours.
I am still optimistic regarding the ANGI turnaround story. The just-released Q4 results seem to point in that direction as well. In the write-up above, I had hopes for the 2026 guidance to serve as a catalyst. That clearly did not happen, and the turnaround will take a bit longer to be reflected in improved financial performance.
The stock is down 20% in pre-market, and I think this is mainly driven by two points:
1) Q4 revenue and EBITDA coming in at the low end of the guidance.
2) Outlook of flat EBITDA for 2026.
Let’s start with the first one. In the Q3 letter, management said:
While EBITDA came in at the lower end of this range, this was achieved even after excluding “two $5 million one-time income items” that were baked into the guidance last quarter. So, if my read of this is correct, Q4 EBITDA actually ended up above management’s initial expectations.
Annual revenue decline was also at the low end of the range, but all of this decline is coming from the intentional wind-down of low-quality network channel leads. This is how Q4 revenue stacks up:
– Proprietary revenue $196m (up +23% from $160m in Q4’24)
– Network revenue $17m (down -79% from $80m in Q4’24)
– Total $241m (down -10% from $268m in Q4’24)
As management correctly reflected: “We held our profit steady while dropping $270 million of network revenue,” and this was achieved in part by “flipping our year-over-year proprietary revenue performance from a -24% decline in 2024 to +17% growth in 2025.”
With network revenues now making up only a small part of the total, and with strong momentum in proprietary revenues, the company appears to be well-positioned for growth going forward.
Now, on the 2026 guidance. Management expects flat EBITDA despite the recent workforce reduction program that was supposed to result in cost savings of $70–$80m. As it turns out, half of the projected savings will be invested in aggressive marketing (“tripling our investment in branded spend,” especially during Q1) and the development of AI tools/staffing, or positioning the company for the “AI-first world.” I am guessing that the other half of savings will probably be offset by the continued roll-off of network revenues (for Q1 and Q2, declines are still going to be significant, becoming flatter in the second half).
I have no opinion on whether these investments in marketing and AI will pay off, but seeing 23% proprietary revenue growth over the last quarter, it would seem that management has found profitable avenues to spend marketing dollars. The whole AI talk is just fluff at the moment, and management will need to deliver tangible results to get any credit for it.
The share count is down to 40m after the buyback of 3m shares during Q4. The company still has $300m in cash sitting on the balance sheet and might continue with repurchases if the stock remains at current levels.
Enterprise value now stands at $600m (market cap of $400m + $200m in net debt). This compares to the guided $140m–$145m in EBITDA or $85–$90m in capex-adjusted EBITDA (capex is mostly capitalized software development expenses, so it makes sense to deduct it fully).
ANGI now trades under 7x EBITDA less capex. That seems like a low price to pay for a business that has just delivered 23% growth in its core segment. But, as I have already noted in the pitch above, this investment mostly boils down to trusting in management to deliver the turnaround results they have promised. Q1 will not shine either, so the judgment call has been pushed to future quarters.
ANGI can’t continue to buy back shares until March 2027 (For tax reasons, It has a post-spin-off buyback limit, which has been exhausted).
On the valuation front, If we exclude both SBC and R&D from EBITDA, ANGI doesn’t look so cheap.
SBC is a cost and Standard practice to include SBC in EBITDA calculations seems reasonable, isn’t it?
Believe by “exclude” they meant to do what you’re saying.
I’ll never understand how we got to a world where SBC is ignored for valuation purposes. Equity analysts did it to remove the noise relating to the mark to market so you could thumb wag the biz results. However it’s meaningless as a valuation metric because as many of us know you’re just a ignoring a large portion of employee compensation and a lot of biz’s look cheap when you do that.
Hard to quantify SBC though. The standard way of doing it is just an estimate.
(but obviously I agree it’s a real cost)
A large portion of the SBC isn’t hard to figure out – it’s just RSUs that you’re granting to your employees. For private cos it’s difficult since you don’t have a mark. However, again, it gets noisy once you account for stock price changes thereafter.
Those are additional layers of difficulty. More basically I meant the cost of SBC is in future information (how much future cash flows per share decrease as a result of the issuance). Using current share price is just an estimate.
You’re overthinking this imo. The relevant part is what you’re comping the employees at and what they think they’re getting. They’re likely viewing it as current share price. Less true for private cos, but we’re not buying private cos.
There’s a separate layer on how you can think about dilution, but it’s ultimately irrelevant if we’re just talking about the EBITDA impact.
Is it overthinking? Seems basic. If your shares are worth $10 but trade for $1, then the cost of paying in stock is higher than the share price suggests
Agreed on SBC, printing shares at these lows is expensive financing that hurts per share value.
Regarding: “On the valuation front, If we exclude both SBC and R&D from EBITDA, ANGI doesn’t look so cheap.”
In my calculations, R&D part is already excluded together with capex and SBC is forecasted to be small going forward at $14m-$18m. So even if everything gets excluded from EBITDA, ANGI is still cheap, especially if growth will resume as per management’s promises.
“We look at capital expenditures and fixed expenses together; we believe that growth in Adjusted EBITDA minus capital expenditures is an effective way to look at performance – and we expect growth in this measure of 12% to 18% in 2026 versus 2025”
How do you assess the risk that further EBITDA have to be invested into business to keep the business float, just like q4?
Yep, to be long here you have to believe management is allocating capital correctly and not just plugging a leaky bucket. For now the story is that they need this elevated expense to offset cutting the lower quality revenues. But remains to be seen whether the story will hold up.
13D filing
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1705110/000092189526000493/xslSCHEDULE_13D_X01/primary_doc.xml
I see that prior to now, they were a 13G shareholder. They purchased an additional 3.1m and now own nearly 3.6m or 8.3% of the company. FWIW, seems that Dusan Senkypl is the CEO of Groupon, so it has operational experience in a somewhat similar biz.
Groupon itself is a similar lousy business
An unexpected resignation of ANGI’s CFO Andrew Russakoff. Although the press release states that he stepped down not because of “any disagreement with the Company”, the hasty timeline looks suspicious. Andrew notified the company only on Mar 6 and will be leaving on the Maer 27, just three weeks later. Not sure what to make of this, but it does not inspire confidence.
CFO resignation also coincides with 13D filings from Pale Fire Capital, which reported increased stake (from 8.3% to 9.8% on Mar 3). But at this point we do not have information whether the activist had any discussions with the company, so CFO’s resignation might be unrelated.
Glad I missed this one. ANGI has be a questionable stock for many years and a lot of road side debris.
Another senior executive has resigned, this time COO Bailey Carson. The announcement stated that the COO’s functions will be taken over by the CEO, so perhaps the move comes as part of the ongoing cost-savings initiative. However, it still looks a bit odd given that the CFO also resigned last month with the same hasty three-week timeline.
Is this rats leaving a sinking ship, or are we thinking the turnaround thesis is still intact?
Good question. Hoping it’s the latter. But wouldn’t be surprised if Pale Fire had something to do with it.
@dt if you had to double your position or sell your entire position which would you choose?
I wouldn’t rush to sell just because a few executives left the C-suite, especially without knowing why. There are plenty of possible explanations. As mentioned above, it could also be tied to activism or ongoing cost-cutting.
Q1 GAAP EPS of -$0.22 beats by $0.11.
Revenue of $238.15M (-3.2% Y/Y) misses by $2.76M.
Shares -8% After hours. Now at $6.26.
dt – at what point do you think this becomes stuck and not turning around?
did you guys read this letter? jeez..
I agree with Dsneidz, the letter from the CEO is hard to take seriously. Strip the AI-pump out and what management is actually saying is: AI-native startups in our space trade at higher multiples than us despite less GMV, so we are going to rebrand as AI-native and chase that multiple. Here is one quote to sum up the vagueness and pumpiness of the whole letter: “we will <...> concentrate on the future instead of the quarters.”
Q1 numbers were actually fine – EBITDA at $23m beat the $15m–$17m guide, proprietary leads and service requests were up double digits. Proprietary revenue continued to grow (albeit at only 7% vs double digit growth in previous quarters). But this is precisely the moment management chose to pull guidance entirely, stop “focusing on near-term revenue goals,” and tell shareholders they “will not be managing to a revenue growth rate.” Companies usually abandon guidance when what comes next will not look good. Management now wants to be judged on something other than the legacy metrics for the foreseeable future.
The “Angi Pro Chief Revenue Officer” sounds grand but, aside from the “making and receiving calls” (which will most likely take ages to develop), the described functionality is pretty thin: automated responses, appointment booking, AI-generated quotes, follow-up. This is CRM and scheduling software with an LLM wrapper. It is not obvious why Angi, of all companies, would be the one to build this and win, or why a small contractor would pay Angi for it rather than use any of the other tools already chasing the same workflow.
Meanwhile, the things that were actually working get deprioritized. The legacy platform, the thing generating $140m of EBITDA, is feature-frozen. A $5bn revenue ambition is floated with no timeline, against a current run rate under $1bn.
The letter does not put a number on the planned AI investments, but I am guessing things will add up quickly. Every product, design, data, and engineering resource is being redeployed to the AI rebuild. Quarterly revenue/profitability targets are gone, which removes the main internal discipline against unprofitable spend. Management promises to “generate consistent profit and cash flow to fully fund our transformation”, but in practice the existing cash pile is also at risk of being thrown at the AI rebuild.
The CFO and COO resignations now read very differently than they did in March and April. The most likely explanation is that they disagreed with this pivot, and they were right to.
My initial thesis underwrote a near-term earnings inflection visible through 2026 guidance. That thesis is now out of the window, and what is left is a much longer, much vaguer AI story funded by a finite cash pile against an open-ended commitment. I am closing my ANGI position and removing ANGI from active ideas.